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1. Introduction
The Swiss-EU Savings Agreement entered into force on
1 July 2005.1 In essence, the Agreement, which
complements the EU Savings Directive,2 introduces
rules regarding the retention on interest paid by `Swiss
paying agents' to individuals residing in the EU.
Article 15 of the Agreement, however, also deals
with dividends, interest and royalty payments between
companies. This provision, which is materially and
systematically completely unrelated to savings taxa-
tion, was introduced in the Agreement at the request of
Switzerland. As we shall see, it is designed to introduce
between this country and EU Member States rules
partially comparable to those embodied in the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive3 and Interest-Royalty Directive.4
Indeed, according to Art. 15(1) and (2), cross-border
dividends, interest and royalty payments between EU
and Swiss companies5 are, under certain conditions, no
longer subject to any withholding tax. As from 1 July
2005, therefore, Art. 15 supersedes double taxation
conventions (DTCs) concluded by Switzerland and EU
Member States, to the extent these agreements are less
favourable. From a procedural point of view, the
benefit of Art. 15(1) may, upon request, be granted
upfront by having the Swiss distributing company
simply declaring (`proceÂdure de declaration', `Melde-
verfahren') the dividends to the Swiss Federal Tax
Administration (FTA).6
The present contribution places Switzerland in the
position of the state of source and discusses the scope
and requirements of Art. 15(1) in the context of
dividends paid by Swiss subsidiaries to their EU parent
companies. After a presentation of the principles
governing the treatment of dividends for Swiss with-
holding tax purposes, we begin by analysing the text of
Art. 15(1) as well as the interpretative issues connected
to this provision. We then move to the specific
conditions of Art. 15(1) and shall, in this context, also
critically review the administrative guidelines issues by
the FTA thereupon on 15 July 2005.7 On the other hand,
we shall here leave aside Art. 15(2). Indeed, Switzerland
currently not levying any withholding tax on royalties
and interest paid on loans8 granted to Swiss companies,
the impact of this provision is limited in practice.
2. Outbound dividends under Swiss withholding
tax
Switzerland levies inter alia a 35 per cent withholding
tax on distributions of profits made by Swiss9
Notes
1 Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation providing for measures equivalent to those laid down in Council Directive 2003/48/EC
of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments. For a general discussion of the Agreement see in particular Xavier Oberson,
`Agreement between Switzerland and the European Union on the Taxation of Savings ± A balanced ``Compromis HelveÂtique'' ', in IBFD Bulletin 2005, no. 3, p. 108.
2 Council Directive 2003/48 of 3 June 2003 on taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments.
3 Council Directive of 23 July 1990 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States (90/
435/EEC) as amended by various Council Directives pursuant to the accession of new Member States, and by Council Directive 2003/123/EC of 22 December 2003.
4 Council Directive of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and royalty payments made between associates companies of different
Member States (2003/49/EC).
5 Including their permanent establishments with respect to interest and royalty payments, see Art. 15(2).
6 This possibility is based on a Federal Ordinance of 22 December 2004 (RS 672.203) which also applies in a treaty context and for qualifying participations. Under
this ordinance, the refund procedure is replaced by a declaration procedure. With respect to Art. 15(1), the benefit of this procedure must be requested to the FTA
by the distributing company before the dividends fall due. This request must be made by using so-called `Form 823C' (see http://www.estv.admin.ch/data/dvs/
druck/forms/forms/823Ce.pdf). If the request is granted, the distributing company then simply declares the dividend free of any withholding tax by using so-called
`Form 108'. A refund procedure, however, is exceptionally applicable in cases in which a dividend is distributed before the two years holding requirement has
elapsed (see n. 7 below).
7 Directives relatives aÁ la suppression de l'impoÃt anticipeÂ suisse sur les paiements de dividendes entre socieÂteÂs de capitaux associeÂes dans les relations entre la Suisse et
les Etats membres de l'Union europeÂenne/Wegleitung betreffend die Aufhebung der schweizerischen Verrechnungssteuer auf Dividendenzahlungen zwischen
verbundenen Kapitalgesellschaften im VerhaÈltnis zwischen der Schweiz und den Mitgliedstaaten der EuropaÈischen Union (hereafter FTA Guidelines (Art. 15)).
8 A withholding tax is indeed only levied on interest stemming from bonds (and similar negotiable debt instruments) as well as on interest on deposits with Swiss
banks.
9 For withholding tax purposes, a `Swiss company' is a company whose statutory seat is in Switzerland or a company incorporated abroad but which is effectively
managed from within Switzerland and exercises an activity therein, see Art. 9, para. 1 of the Swiss Federal Withholding Tax Law of 13 October 1965, RS 642.21
(WHTL).
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companies.10 As a rule, the tax claim arises when the
income falls due,11 the tax must be withheld by the
distributing company and paid to the FTA.12
The concept of taxable distribution of profit for
withholding tax purposes is fairly broad and is
construed according to a substance over form
approach (`interpreÂtation selon la reÂaliteÂ eÂconomique';
`wirtschaftliche Betrachtungsweise'). In essence, it
covers any payment made by a Swiss company to its
shareholder or to a related party which does not
constitute a reimbursement of the company's nominal
capital (nominal value principle).13 The taxable basis
may therefore consist of both opened and hidden
reserves. For example, distributions subject to with-
holding tax typically include cash and stock dividends,
hidden profit distributions (including interest paid on
constructive equity), total and partial liquidating
distributions. Moreover, certain emigrations transac-
tions also entail a deemed liquidation. Specifically, the
transfer of a company's seat outside of Switzerland,14
or an emigration merger, is assimilated to a liquidating
distribution (liquidation fiction).15
Unless an international agreement provides other-
wise, non-residents may not claim an exemption
from or the reimbursement of the withholding tax
levied on distributions of profits made to them.16 For
these persons, the Swiss withholding tax thus
pursues, as a matter of principle, a fiscal function
(`Fiskalzweck').
By contrast, residents of Switzerland, in particular
companies having their statutory seat in this country17
are, under certain conditions, entitled to a full
reimbursement of the Swiss withholding tax. That is,
they must first of all report the distribution of profit
for direct tax purposes.18 Secondly, according to Art.
21(1), lit a of WHTL, these persons must be the
beneficial owners (`droit de jouissance'; `Recht zur
Nutzung') of the income received. Finally, Art. 21(2) of
WHTL stipulates that the reimbursement of the
withholding tax is subject to the absence of tax
avoidance by abuse law.19 For Swiss residents satisfy-
ing these conditions, therefore, the Swiss withholding
tax is primarily aiming at ensuring compliance with
direct tax reporting requirements (`Sicherungszweck').
As we shall see, although they govern the reimburse-
ment of the Swiss withholding tax in a purely domestic
context, these provisions may also come into play in
the context of an abusive application of Art. 15(1).
3. Article 15(1) and interpretative issues
Article 15(1) provides that:
`Without prejudice to the application of domestic or
agreement-based provisions for the prevention of
fraud or abuse in Switzerland and in Member
States, dividends paid by subsidiary companies to
parent companies shall not be subject to taxation in
the source State where:
± The parent company has a direct minimum
holding of 25 per cent of the capital of such a
subsidiary for at least two years, and,
± One company is resident for tax purposes in a
Member State and the other company is resident
for tax purposes in Switzerland, and,
± Under any double tax agreements with any third
States neither company is resident for tax
purposes in that third State, and,
± Both companies are subject to corporation tax
without being exempted and both adopt the
form of a limited company.'
However, Estonia may, for as long as it charges income
tax on distributed profits without taxing undistributed
profits, and at the latest until 31 December 2008,
continue to apply that tax to profits distributed by
Estonian subsidiary companies to their parent compa-
nies established in Switzerland.
Finally according to Art. 15(3):
`Existing double taxation agreements between
Switzerland and the Member States which provide
for a more favourable taxation treatment of
dividends . . . at the time of adoption of this
Agreement shall remain unaffected.'
As can be seen, there are several textual similarities
between Art. 15(1) and the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.
To begin with, the reference to `domestic or agreement
based provisions' is clearly inspired from Art. 1(2) of the
Notes
10 Art. 4(1), lit b of WHTL.
11 Art. 12 of WHTL.
12 Art. 10 of WHTL. Specifically, according to Art. 14(1) of WHTL the debtor is under the obligation to transfer the tax liability to the creditor by deducting the
amount of the withholding tax.
13 Art. 20 (1) of the Swiss Federal Withholding Tax Ordinance, RS 642.211 (WHTO).
14 See for example Peter BruÈ lisauer, `Sitzverlegung ins Ausland nach Verrechnungssteuerrecht', in FStR 2004, p. 48; Thomas MuÈ ller, `Die solidarische Mithaftung bei
der Sitzverlegung ins Ausland', in StR 2000, p. 78. This liquidation fiction applies even if a permanent establishment is maintained in Switzerland after the
restructuring since, in such case, the company is no longer `Swiss' within the meaning of Art. 9 of WHTL and therefore the withholding tax claim is not preserved.
15 Art. 4(2) of WHTL.
16 Subject however to certain exceptions, see Art. 24(3) and 4, Arts. 27 and 28 of WHTL.
17 Art. 24(2) of WHTL.
18 Art. 23 of WHTL.
19 In addition, the reimbursement must be requested within three years following the one in which the income arose (Art. 32(1) of WHTL).
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Directive. Further, the reference to domestic and treaty
law for the purpose of determining fiscal residence as
well as the requirement that a company be `subject to
corporation tax without being exempted' are in line
with Art. 2(1)(b) and (c) of the Directive. At the same
time, however, the text of both instruments is not
identical. For example, Art. 15(1) refers to `dividends'
while the Parent-Subsidiary Directive uses the expres-
sion `distribution of profits'.20 Similarly, Art. 15(1)
requires a direct shareholding of 25 per cent whereas
under the Directive this threshold is gradually reduced
to 10 per cent as a result of its 2003 amendment. Finally,
the scope of Art. 15(1) does not fully coincide with that
of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. First of all, Art. 15(1)
deals only with the state of source and the exemption
from withholding tax. By contrast, it is not concerned
with the elimination of economic double taxation by the
state of residence of the parent company. Article 15(1)
does therefore not contain a rule comparable to that laid
down in Art. 4 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.
Secondly, while, as a result in particular of the recent
case law of the ECJ,21 permanent establishments are
included in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive since its 2003
amendment,22 the latter, by contrast, are out of the
scope of Art. 15(1).
In light of the foregoing, an important issue which
must thus be settled in relation to Art. 15(1) is whether,
and if so to what extent, the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
can be said to be relevant in the context of the
interpretation of this provision. As a starting point, it
should be borne in mind that Art. 15(1) forms part of an
international Agreement. It is therefore subject to the
interpretative provisions (Arts. 31 to 32) of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties23 (VC).24 Moreover,
the Agreement not containing a lex specialis comparable
to Art. 3(2) of the OECD MC providing for a reference
to domestic law,25 the interpretation of its terms is, in
our view, solely governed by the rules of the VC.
Accordingly, the interpretation of Art. 15 should
begin by considering the ordinary meaning of its
terms.26 If appropriate, however, the teleological
interpretation27 should also refine this textual analysis.
In our opinion, the influence that the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive may have in this area is precisely of a
teleological nature. Indeed, as indicated, the context in
which the Agreement was adopted clearly reveals that
the purpose of Art. 15 is to partially extend the regime
embodied in the Parent-Subsidiary and the Interest-
Royalties Directives to Switzerland. For example, the
Council decision of 2 June 2004 on the signing and
conclusion of the Agreement states:
`the Community has decided to grant the request of
the Swiss Confederation for the inclusion in the
Agreement of measures equivalent to the regimes
provided for in Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23
July 1990 on the common system of taxation
applicable in the case of parent companies and
subsidiaries of different Member States and in
Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a
common system of taxation applicable to interest
and royalty payments made between associated
companies of different Member States in their
original versions.'
Therefore, in our opinion, an interpretation of Art. 15
on the basis of its object and purpose should, where
appropriate, take into consideration the provisions of the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive as construed by the case law
of the ECJ28 and leading scholarly opinion. As a matter
of fact, this line of reasoning is not new in Switzerland.
Indeed, in a decision of 28 February 200129 involving Art.
10 (dividends) of the Switzerland-Luxembourg DTC, the
Swiss Federal Appeal Commission for Tax Matters
observed that the purpose of this provision was
essentially to introduce, between the Contracting States,
rules similar to those contained in the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive. The Court consequently arrived at the
conclusion that a contextual interpretation of this
provision could not ignore this instrument.
4. Payment of dividends
With respect to the payment of dividends, several
issues need to be clarified. First of all, the meaning of
the term `dividends' used by the Agreement must be
Notes
20 Art. 1.
21 See in particular Compagnie de Saint-Gobain v Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, C-307/97, ECJ.
22 See thereupon Guglielmo Maisto, `The 2003 amendments to the EC Parent-Subsidiary Directive: what's next?', EC Tax Review 2004, no. 4, p. 177.
23 Vienna Convention of 23 May 1969 on The Law of Treaties (RS 0.111).
24 Oberson, see n. 1 above, p. 109; Howard R Hull, `The EC Parent-Subsidiary Directive in Switzerland ± Swiss Outbound Dividends', in IBFD Bulletin 2005, p. 69.
25 Rather, the Agreement simply provides for a consultation procedure designed to resolve interpretative issues through a mutual agreement (see Art. 12 of the
Agreement).
26 Art. 31(1) ab initio VC, Swiss Federal Tribunal Judgment of 17 February 1971, ATF 97 I 364; Jean-Marc Rivier, `L'interpreÂ tation des Conventions de double
imposition', in Revue de Droit Administratif et de Droit Fiscal (RDAF) (Lausanne, Switzerland, 2000), p. 113; Xavier Oberson, PreÂcis de droit fiscal international,
2nd ed. (Bern, 2004), p. 25, no. 80; Peter Locher, EinfuÈhrung in das internationale Steurrecht der Schweiz, 3rd ed. (Bern, 2005), p. 117; Ekkehart Reimer,
`Interpretation of Tax Treaties', in European Taxation 1999, pp. 462±464; Stanley Katz, `Interpretation of Double Taxation Conventions (US national report)', in
Cahier de Droit Fiscal International (The Hague, 1993), vol. LXXVIIIa, p. 629.
27 Art. 31(1) in fine VC.
28 In the same vein Hull, see n. 24 above, p. 70.
29 StR 2002 30, 37.
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identified. Secondly, the temporal scope of Art. 15(1)
needs to be ascertained. Finally, as Art. 15(1) refers to
dividends paid `to' parent companies, it is submitted
that the benefits of this provision are subject to a
`personal attribution of income requirement' the
meaning of which must be clarified in the specific
context of the Agreement.
A. The concept of `dividends paid'
1. Under the Agreement
Article 15(1) refers to `dividends' but does not provide
for a definition of this term. In its guidelines the FTA
contends that this term should be defined in light of
Art. 10(3) of the OECD MC.30 The first sentence of
this provision defines the term `dividends' autono-
mously by stipulating that it means: `income from
shares, ``jouissance'' shares or ``jouissance'' rights,
mining shares, founders' shares or other rights, not
being debt-claims, participating in profits . . .'. This
autonomous definition is however complemented by a
general reference to the domestic law of the state of
source: `as well as income from other corporate rights
which is subjected to the same taxation treatment as
income from shares by the laws of the State of which
the company making the distribution is a resident'.
As we shall see, the conclusion at which the FTA
arrives on the basis of this interpretation is essentially
correct. Yet, we submit that referring to Art. 10 of the
OECD MC to define the notion of `dividends' used by
Art. 15 is methodologically erroneous. First of all,
there is no reference to the OECD MC in Art. 15.
Further, there is no indication whatsoever of an
intention of Switzerland and the EU Member States
to rely on the OECD MC. Secondly, there is an
essential structural difference between Art. 15 and Art.
10(3) of the OECD MC. Indeed, contrary to Art. 10(3)
of the OECD MC, Art. 15 does not contain a general
reference to the domestic law of the state of source.
Moreover, as mentioned, such reference is generally
not possible under the Agreement in the absence of a
provision comparable to Art. 3(2) of the OECD MC.
The structure of Art. 10(3) of the OECD MC is thus
different from that of Art. 15 which requires the term
`dividends' to be defined autonomously.
In our opinion, the concept of `dividends' incorpo-
rated in Art. 15(1) should rather be construed in light of
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. It is certainly true that
this conclusion may at first sight be challenged on the
ground that the Directive does not refer to `dividends'
but instead to `distribution of profits'. On the basis of a
strict literal interpretation it could thus be argued that,
by referring to `dividends' rather than to `distribution of
profits', Art. 15 is meant to be narrower than the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive. This being said, in our
opinion, the interpretative process reveals that the term
`dividends' used by Art. 15 has the same meaning than
the expression `distribution of profits' under the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive. First of all, Art. 15(1) contains a
reservation in favour of Estonia as regards payments by
Estonian subsidiaries companies to their parent compa-
nies in Switzerland. This reservation, which is designed
to take into account that under Estonian law undis-
tributed profits are not subject to tax, stipulates that
`profits distributed' by Estonian companies do not fall
within the scope of Art. 15 until 31 December 2008 at
the latest.31 Absent such a reservation, Art. 15 would
thus have been applicable to `profits distributed' by an
Estonian company. The use by this reservation of the
term `profits distributed', which is identical to the
expression `distribution of profits', therefore suggests an
interpretation in light of the Parent-Subsidiary Direc-
tive. Secondly, Art. 15 and the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive are structurally similar in that they do not
contain any definition in this area nor any reference to
domestic law. The expressions `dividends' and `dis-
tributions of profits' used respectively by Art. 15 and the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive must both be given an
autonomous meaning and are consequently of the same
nature.32 Finally, the objective of Art. 15 is clearly
partially to introduce between Switzerland and the EU
Member States benefits which are analogous to those
embodied in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive. While the
scope of Art. 15 and some of its conditions do not fully
coincide with those of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, it
is submitted that this objective may only be achieved if a
payment that qualifies as a distribution of profits under
the Directive falls within the scope of Art. 15 when it is
made to a Swiss parent company. The teleological
interpretation consequently also confirms this conclu-
sion.
In light of the foregoing, we shall now try to define
the meaning of a `distribution of profits' under the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive and determine whether,
and if so, to what extent, a definition of the concept of
`dividends' pursuant to this meaning would differ from
the interpretation of the FTA based on Art. 10(3) of the
OECD MC. As a starting point, it can be observed that
the expression `distribution of profits', which is to be
construed substantively,33 is fairly broad and is
designed to apply not only to payments that are
Notes
30 FTA Guidelines (Art. 15), s. 3.
31 This reservation, on the other hand, does not apply to distributions made by a Swiss company to its Estonian parent company, FTA Guidelines (Art. 15, s. 2b).
32 For the Parent-Subsidiary Directive see Ben Terra and Peter Wattel, European Tax Law, 4th ed. (Kluwer, 2005), 514±515; Marjanna Helminen, The Dividend
Concept in International Tax Law (Kluwer, 2000), p. 73; Marjanna Helminen, `Dividend equivalent benefits and the concept of profit distribution of the EC Parent-
Subsidiary Directive', in EC Tax Review 2000, p. 162.
33 Terra and Wattel, see n. 32 above, p. 514.
INTERTAX, Volume 33, Issue 11 # Kluwer Law International 2005 506
International Tax Review
formally labelled as `dividends'.34 Rather, a distribu-
tion of profits covers any kind of transfer of benefit
from a qualifying subsidiary to another qualifying
parent company for no equivalent value or benefit in
exchange.35 Further, it is immaterial, for this purpose,
whether the dividend is financed by current profits,
opened or hidden reserves.
Based on this broad definition, it is possible to
contend that the exemption laid down in Art. 5 of the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive applies to both cash and
stock dividends (bonus shares). Similarly, this
exemption is also applicable to liquidating distribu-
tions.36 Secondly, a substance over form approach
being relevant in this area, the expression also covers
hidden profits distributions37 (constructive divi-
dends) made by a subsidiary.38 Among these pay-
ments are also interest payments reclassified as a
hidden profit distribution pursuant to thin capitali-
zation rules applied at the level of the subsidiary.
Moreover, as we shall see, a constructive equity
should be regarded as `capital' for the purpose of
calculating the holding of the parent company in the
subsidiary.39
It is undisputed that these profit distributions also
qualify as `dividends' under Art. 10(3) of the OECD
MC.40 In this area, therefore, it is fair to say that the
interpretation suggested by the FTA leads to the same
conclusion as that we are advocating.41
Another question, however, which is not discussed
by the FTA in its guidelines, is whether purely `fictive
distributions' are also covered by Art. 15. In essence, a
fictive distribution is an operation that is fiscally
treated as a distribution of profits but which, from a
private law or even economic point of view, does not
lead to any transfer of benefit to the company's
shareholders. From the perspective of the state of
residence a well-known example, which has been
discussed in the context of the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive, is distributions that a parent company is
deemed to derive in accordance with a CFC legisla-
tion.42 On the other hand, for Switzerland and when
this country is placed in the position of the state of
source, with which Art. 15 is solely concerned, fictive
distributions, as we have seen, typically come into play
in the case of certain emigration transactions (cross-
border transfer of seat, merger or division etc.) which,
for withholding tax purposes, are assimilated to a
liquidation of the Swiss company.
Whether a fictive distribution falls within the scope
of Art. 10(3) of the OECD MC is debated among
scholars and is not clearly settled by the OECD
Commentary.43 It may certainly be argued that by
referring to the tax treatment in the state of source, the
second sentence of Art. 10(3) of the OECD MC also
includes a fictive distribution where such distribution
is fiscally classified as `income from shares' in that
state. However, such distribution must also be `paid'
within the meaning of Art. 10(1) of the OECD MC.
According to the OECD Commentary the term `paid'
has a very wide meaning but it is characterized by the
fact that funds are put at the disposal of the
shareholder.44 In other words, the term `paid' implies
a real shift of assets or value from one taxpayer to
another.45 For this reason, it has been argued that
fictitious income does not fall under Art. 10 of the
OECD MC.46 Relying on the fact that this expression
should be defined lege fori in accordance with Art. 3(2)
of the OECD MC, other commentators, on the
contrary, have arrived at the conclusion that a fictive
distribution should be regarded as being `paid' if the
state of source treats it as such.47
This being said, in our opinion, this latter reasoning
may at any rate not be transposed to Art. 15 which, in
the absence of a comparable rule, requires the term
Notes
34 See Susan Bell, `Cross-Border Repatriation of Dividends', in IBFD Derivatives & Financial Instruments journal (DFI) 2005, p. 18; Maisto, see n. 22 above, p. 177;
Helminen, n. 32 above, 2000a, p. 74; Helminen, 2000b, n. 32 above, p. 162.
35 Helminen, 2000b, n. 32 above, p. 162; Helminen 2000a, n. 32 above, p. 74. Similarly, Terra and Wattel, see n. 32 above, p. 514 define a distribution of profits as `any
value shift to the parent company at the expense of the capital of the subsidiary. . .'.
36 See Bell, n. 34 above, p. 25; Terra and Wattel, see n. 32 above, p. 515; Helminen, see n. 32 above, 2000b, p. 171; Helminen 2000a, n. 32 above, p. 356. Under the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive, this conclusion is based on a systematic interpretation. That is, it has been argued that because liquidating distributions are expressly
excluded under Art. 4 (`.except when the subsidiary is liquidated'), the conclusion may be drawn a contrario that such payments are covered by Art. 5 (see for
example Helminen 2000b, n. 32 above, p. 171).
37 As regards the issue of hidden profit distributions made between related companies, see 4.C. of this article.
38 Helminen, 2000a, n. 32 above, p. 236; Terra and Wattel, n. 32 above, p. 515. See also the opinion of Advocate General Mischo of 26 September 2002 in C-324/00
(Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v Finanzamt Seinfurt) decided by the ECJ on 12 December 2002. In this opinion, the Advocate General, endorsing the view expressed
by Denmark, considered that a covert distribution should, under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, receive the same treatment than an overt distribution.
39 See section 6 of this article.
40 See in particular OECD Commentary paras. 15 and 28 and Art. 10 of the OECD MC.
41 See FTA Guidelines (Art. 15, ss. 3 and 4).
42 See for example recently Marjaana Helminen, `Is There a Future for CFC Regimes in Europe?', in Intertax 2005, p. 118. The compatibility of CFC legislations with
EU law is currently at stake further to the Cadbury Schweppes case (C-196/04) pending before the ECJ.
43 See OECD Commentary, para. 38 and Art. 10 of the OECD MC.
44 OECD Commentary, para. 7 and Art. 10 of the OECD MC.
45 Peter Wattel and Otto Marres, `Characterization of Fictitious Income under OECD-Patterned Tax Treaties', in European Taxation 2003, p. 68.
46 Wattel and Marres, ibid., p. 74.
47 Helminen, 2000a , n. 32 above, p. 214.
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`paid' to be defined autonomously in accordance with
the rules of the VC. Accordingly, the issue that must be
settled is whether this autonomous meaning also
encompasses fictive distributions. It is submitted that
an interpretation of the term `paid' in light of the
object and purpose of Art. 15 dictates an affirmative
answer. Indeed, the leading interpretation of the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive is that if, from a fiscal
point of view, a state assimilates a particular operation
to a distribution, such operation then becomes a
`distribution of profits'.48 Further, a justification for
the eligibility of fictive distributions to the benefits of
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive may also be found in
the fact that the purpose of this instrument is to
encourage and facilitate the setting up of cross-border
enterprises.49 A teleological interpretation of the term
`paid' on the basis Parent-Subsidiary Directive conse-
quently reveals that Art. 15 also applies to fictive
distributions.
We therefore arrive at the conclusion that the
expression `dividends' embodied in Art. 15, which
should be construed in accordance with a substance
over form approach, refers to any transfer of benefit
that is made by a company to its shareholder (or
related party) for no equivalent benefit, whether
stemming from current profits, opened or hidden
reserves. It covers in particular the following:
. Ordinary dividend distributions (whether in cash
or in kind).
. Payment stemming from a partial or total liquida-
tion of the subsidiary (liquidating distributions).
. Hidden profit distributions, including interest
payments reclassified as constructive dividends
under thin capitalization rules.
. Payments or transactions (whether actual or
fictive) classified as or assimilated to a distribution
of profits under the laws of the state of source.
This definition is very much in line with that favoured
by the FTA which relies on the definition contained in
Art. 10(3) of the OECD MC. As shown above, it is by
contrast controversial whether a fictive distribution
falls within the scope of this provision. On the other
hand, an interpretation based on the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive, such as that we are advocating, entails that
fictive distributions should indeed be covered by Art.
15.
Having identified the meaning of the expression
`dividends paid' under Art. 15, let us now examine the
impact of this provision on Swiss domestic (with-
holding) tax law.
2. Impact under Swiss domestic (withholding) tax law
In our opinion, the concept of `dividends' contained in
Art. 15 is sufficiently broad to cover all distributions of
profits that are subject to Swiss domestic withholding
tax. First of all, it is possible to characterize as
`dividend' any transfer of benefit that is made by a
company to its shareholder or related party for no
equivalent benefit. This definition therefore very much
coincides with the Swiss withholding tax concept of
distribution of profit which, as we have seen, is also to
be construed in accordance with a substance over form
approach. Further, relying on a teleological interpreta-
tion of Art. 15, we concluded that fictive distributions
should also be covered by this provision. Therefore, in
our opinion, a liquidation fiction stemming from a
cross-border restructuring (transfer of seat, merger) is
covered by Art. 15.
B. Temporal scope of Article 15 and
`compartimentalization' of dividends
Another question which must be settled with respect to
Art. 15 is the material time at which the conditions of
this provision must be met. In other words, as for
DTCs, the temporal scope (`Schrankenwirkung')50 of
Art. 15 must be identified.
In our opinion the term `paid' used by Art. 15 (as
well as by Art. 10(1) of the OECD MC), indicates that
the conditions laid down by this provision are to be
satisfied at the time the dividends falls due.51 There-
fore, for example, Art. 15 will not be applicable if,
upon the payment of a dividend, the Swiss subsidiary is
no longer owned by a Belgian parent company but,
say, by a US corporation. It is immaterial for this
purpose that this dividend is in fact paid out of profits
generated during the time the Swiss subsidiary was
controlled by a Belgian company. By mirrored reason-
ing, Art. 15 should apply in the reverse case, that is
where a dividend is financed by profits realized at a
time at which the requirements of this provision were
not met. Indeed, unlike certain treaty provisions,52 Art.
15 (and Art. 10(1) of the OECD MC) is not concerned
with the origin or cause of the payment (`KausalitaÈt-
sprinzip') but focuses on the contrary exclusively on
the time at which this payment is made (`Zuflus-
Notes
48 Bell, see n. 34 above, p. 25; Helminen, 2000b, n. 32 above, p. 164; Helminen, 2000a, n. 32 above, p. 209. See also CeÂ cile Brokelind, `Ten years of application of the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive', in EC Tax Review 2003, p. 161.
49 Claus Staringer in IFA, Cross-Border Effects of Restructuring Including Change of Legal Form, vol. 25d (IFA Congress Seminar series, Munich), (Kluwer, 2000), p.
85.
50 See Joseph Schuch, Die Zeit im Recht der Doppelbesteuerungsabkommen (Vienna, 2002), p. 151; Robert J. Danon. and Hugues Salome, `De la double imposition
internationale', in Archives de droit fiscal Suisse 73 (2004/2005), p. 367.
51 Which is also recognized by the FTA; see FTA Guidelines (Art. 15, s. 11).
52 See for example Art. 15 of the OECD MC dealing with employment income.
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sprinzip').53
A so-called `compartimentalization' of dividends
(based on the origin of the profits financing the
distribution) is therefore not compatible with the
ordinary meaning of the term `paid' contained in Art.
15. The object and purpose of Art. 15 also supports
this conclusion as this position is also the one defended
under the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.54 This being
said, in the field of DTCs, the FTA generally relies on
such a `compartimentalization' of dividends which is
known as the `old reserves theory' (`Alreservenpraxis').
Broadly speaking, this practice entails that if a resident
of State A, for example in the course of a restructuring,
transfers a Swiss subsidiary to a resident of State B and
that the Swiss State B DTC provides for more
favourable conditions (typically a lower residual rate
on dividends) than the Swiss-State A DTC, the
distributable reserves existing at the time of the
transfer will remain nonetheless subject to the Swiss-
State A DTC. Accordingly, upon distribution of a
dividend stemming from these old reserves, the Swiss
withholding tax will be reduced in accordance with the
Swiss-State A DTC, regardless of whether such
dividend is actually `paid' to a resident of State B.
Invoking in particular the temporal scope of Swiss
treaty provisions patterned upon Art. 10(1) of the
OECD MC, Swiss leading commentators have heavily
criticized this `old reserves theory'.55 Despite these
criticisms, however, the guidelines relating to Art. 15
clearly indicate that the FTA will continue to apply
this theory in the context of this provision.56 Accord-
ingly, Art. 15 would not be applicable where, for
example, a dividend is distributed to a Belgian parent
company out of profits generated at a time at which
the Swiss distributing subsidiary was a controlled by a
US parent company.
In our opinion, the application of the `old reserves
theory' as a general rule, whether in the context of
DTCs or Art. 15, is arbitrary and grossly ignores the
temporal principles governing the payment of divi-
dends. Rather, in our view, this theory may only come
into play where an abusive application of Art. 15 is at
stake On the contrary, there is no room for such a
theory if, for instance in the context of a bona fide
restructuring motivated by obvious business reasons, a
Swiss participation is transferred to a European
holding company. In this respect, whether or not a
restructuring is abusive, should, in our view, be
decided solely in light of the specific concept of abuse
that is relevant in the context of Art. 15.57
C. Entitlement and personal attribution of income
1. Under the Agreement
The application of DTCs patterned upon the OECD
MC presupposes a connection between the treaty
favoured income (tax object) and a given taxpayer (tax
subject).58 In our opinion, this condition flows from
the language of the distributive rules, which by using
terms such as `derived by',59 `profits of',60 `income
of',61 `paid to',62 clearly express a personal attribution
of income requirement.63 This being said, a definition
of these terms lege fori pursuant to Art. 3(2) of the
OECD MC may lead to double (or to double non-)
taxation where the domestic attribution rules of both
Contracting States are not identical (`conflicts of
attribution'; `Zurechnungskonflikte'). In order to
resolve these conflicts, which for example typically
come into play in the field of partnerships, trusts and
other hybrid vehicles,64 we have argued that, in source-
residence conflicts, these `connecting terms' should
receive a contextual meaning. Specifically, we have
arrived at the conclusion that, in accordance with the
general recommendation embodied in the OECD
Partnership Report:65
`the State of source should take into account, as part
of the factual context in which the Convention is to be
applied, the way in which an item of income, arising in
its jurisdiction, is treated in the jurisdiction of the
Notes
53 In the field of DTCs see in particular Maja Bauer-Balmelli, `Altreservenpraxis ± ein rechtliches Argumentarium', in IFF Forum 2004, p. 205; Danon and Salome, n.
50 above, p. 367.
54 Terra and Wattel, see n. 32 above, p. 514.
55 Bauer-Balmelli, see n. 53 above, p. 201.
56 FTA Guidelines (Art. 15, s. 3). On the other hand, if the former shareholder resides in an EU state, Art. 15 would be applicable unless the DTC concluded by
Switzerland with that state is more favourable
57 For the definition of abuse in the context of Art. 15, see later in this article.
58 Hugh J. Ault, `Issues Related to the Identification and Characteristics of the Taxpayer', in IBFD Bulletin 2002, p. 263; Robert J. Danon and Hugues Salome,
`Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation in Switzerland (Swiss national report)' in (ed. Michael Lang), Avoidance of Double Non-Taxation, Schriftenreihe zum
Internationalen Steuerrecht (Schulthess, Linde Verlag, 2003), p. 388; Robert J. Danon and Hugues Salome, `La double non-imposition (Swiss national report)', in
Cahiers de droit fiscal international (CDFI), vol. LXXXVIVa (Kluwer, 2004), p. 677.
59 Arts. 6(1); 15(1); 16(1) and 17(1) of the OECD MC.
60 Art. 7(1) of the OECD MC.
61 Art. 21, para. 1 of the OECD MC.
62 Arts. 10(1), 11(1), 18(1), 19(1) of the OECD MC.
63 Danon and Salome, see n. 58 above, p. 340.
64 See Robert J. Danon, Switzerland's direct and international taxation of private express trusts (Geneva, 2003), p. 296.
65 OECD, `The Application of the OECD Model Convention to Partnerships', in Issues in International Taxation Series no. 6 (Paris, 1999).
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person claiming the benefits of the Convention as a
resident.'66
In other words, an item of income can be considered
to be paid `to' a resident of a Contracting State where,
under the attribution rules of such state, this income is
allocated to this person. As we have shown, this
conclusion is, from a systematic point of view,
supported by the relationship existing between the
distributive rules and the principle of relative effect of
DTCs which apply only `to persons who are residents of
one or more or both of the Contracting States'.67
Accordingly, it seems logical to draw the conclusion
that this principle implies that DTCs are only to
produce their effects within the limits of the fiscal
sovereignty of the Contracting States. In other words,
the application of a DTC requires the item of income
covered by the relevant distributive rule to enter into the
taxing jurisdiction of the other Contracting State.68
From this perspective, therefore, turning to the attribu-
tion rules of the state of residence to ascertain whether
this is the case, is the most convincing solution.69
In our opinion, the same interpretation should
prevail in the context of Art. 15. That is, where under
the laws of the state of residence, a dividend is
allocated to the parent company for tax purposes,70 the
state of source should, regardless of its own attribution
rules, consider that such dividend is `paid to' the parent
company within the meaning of Art. 15. In fact, the
need for such a contextual interpretation is even more
apparent under Art. 15 which, as we have seen, does
not contain a provision comparable to Art. 3(2) of the
OECD MC. Further, by requiring that the dividend be
allocated to the parent company in the residence state,
this interpretation ensures that the relative effect of the
Agreement be complied with.
2. Impact under Swiss domestic (withholding) tax law
Swiss withholding tax attribution principles are, as a
matter of principle, rooted in the so-called `direct
beneficiary theory' (`DirektbeguÈnstigungstheorie').71
That is, for Swiss withholding tax purposes, the
recipient of a distribution of profit is the person
benefiting directly from this distribution. In other
words, the party to whom a distribution of profit is
attributed is not necessary the shareholder. The impact
of this theory, as well as the differences existing
between Switzerland and EU Member States in this
area, essentially materialize in the field of hidden profit
distributions made between group companies. Indeed,
the `direct beneficiary theory' entails that a hidden
profit distribution made to a sister company is
attributed to that company.72 By contrast, under the
`triangular theory' adopted by several European
jurisdictions, such distribution will be deemed to be
paid to the common parent company which, in turn,
will be considered as making a capital contribution to
the group company73 (`dividend up and contribution to
capital down').74
As shown by the following example, such differ-
ences may lead to conflicts of attribution which may
adversely affect the application of Art. 15. Suppose
that P is a company resident in an EU Member State
for domestic tax and treaty purposes. P wholly owns
Sub. 1, a company resident in Switzerland for domestic
tax and treaty purposes, and Sub. 2, a company
resident in the US. In the context of a reorganization,
Sub. 1 transfers its participation in company X at book
value to its sister company, Sub. 2. Under the laws of
the EU Member State the constructive dividend
stemming from the transfer (difference between fair
market value and book value of the participation) is
deemed to be paid to P (triangular theory). For Swiss
withholding tax purposes the transfer will equally be
treated as a hidden profit distribution. However, in
accordance with the `direct beneficiary' theory, such
distribution will, from a domestic tax perspective, be
considered to be made to Sub. 2.
Relying on its own domestic attribution principles
Notes
66 This general recommendation has been included in the 2000 update of the OECD Commentary; see para. 6.3 and Art. 1of the OECD MC.
67 Art. 1 of the OECD MC.
68 Danon and Salome, 2003, n. 58 above, p. 402.
69 Danon and Salome, 2003, n. 58 above, p. 402.
70 Whether, on the contrary, the income allocated is in addition subject to tax or exempted (by virtue for example of a participation exemption) is irrelevant for this
purpose.
71 See for example Markus Reich, in: Zweifel and Athanas, Kommentar zum Schweizerischen Steuerrecht II/2, Bundesgesetz uÈber die Verrechnungssteuer (Zurich,
2005), p. 435 and Art. 14. In some limited cases, however, the triangular theory (`Dreieckstheorie') is exceptionally applied, see FTA notice of February 2001 and
thereupon, Maja Bauer-Balmelli, `AÈ nderung in der Anwendung von Dreicks- und DirektbeguÈ nstigtentheorie', in FStR 2001, p. 58.
72 See in particular ASA 59 496, Stockar and Hochreutener (eds.), Die Praxis der Bundessteuern, II. Teil: Stempelabgaben und Verrechnungssteuer, Band 2, Basel, nos.
12 and 25 and VStG 14.
73 See Helminen, 2000a, n. 32 above, p. 238.
74 J. David B. Oliver, `The Parent-Subsidiary Directive of 23 July 1990: A United Kingdom Perspective', in EC Tax Review 2001, no. 4, p. 217.
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(`direct beneficiary theory'), Switzerland could, in such
case, argue that Art. 15 does not apply, the hidden
profit not being made to P but rather to Sub 2, a
company resident outside the EU and not owning Sub.
1 directly. By contrast, Art. 15 would have been
applicable, had the attribution principles of Switzer-
land been identical to those of the EU state (`triangular
approach'). In other words, it is solely domestic law
which here would entail the non-application of Art. 15.
For the time being it seems that the FTA will
continue to rely on the `direct beneficiary theory'75 and
therefore probably not apply Art. 15 in the foregoing
circumstances. In our opinion, however, the denial, by
the state of source, of the benefits of Art. 15 on the
mere ground of diverging domestic attribution princi-
ples, is not acceptable. Rather, as we have shown, this
type of conflict of attribution should be resolved by
construing the term `paid to' in accordance with the
laws of the state of residence.76 Accordingly, the
hidden profit distribution being made to P under the
laws of the EU Member State, Switzerland, should, in
this example, consider that this distribution is `paid to'
P (regardless of its own domestic attribution princi-
ples) and, therefore, that Art. 15 applies. It is
interesting to observe that some commentators also
favour such an autonomous analysis in the context of
Art. 5 (exemption from withholding tax) of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive. For example, in the field of
secondary transfer pricing adjustments made between
sister companies, Maisto observes that domestic law
qualifications should not influence the application of
this provision. Therefore, for this author, the circum-
stance that the domestic law of the source state views
the profit distributed directly to the sister company is
immaterial.77
On the contrary, such conflicts of attribution are
less likely to occur in the field of cross-border
restructurings leading to a deemed liquidation for
withholding tax purposes (transfer of seat, merger).78
Indeed, in these instances, the assimilation to a
liquidation entails that the fictive distribution is lege
fori also considered to be made to shareholders (and
not, for example, to the absorbing company in the case
of a merger).79
5. Tax residence
Article 15(1) applies where `one company is resident
for tax purposes in a Member State and the other
company is resident for tax purposes in Switzerland,
and, under any double tax agreements with any third
States neither company is resident for tax purposes in
that third State . . .'. The language of Art. 15(1) is here
clearly inspired from Art. 2(1)(b) of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive which requires that a company
be regarded as a resident of a Member State for
domestic tax purposes and, in addition, under any
DTC concluded with a third state (`under the terms of
a double taxation agreement concluded with a third
State, is not considered to be resident for tax purposes
outside the Community'). The purpose of Art. 2(1)(b)
is to exclude from the scope of the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive so-called `dual-resident companies' which,
for example, are incorporated in a Member State but
which, in accordance with a DTC concluded with a
non-EU state (typically on the basis of a tie-breaker
rule patterned upon Art. 4(3) of the OECD MC), are
considered to be resident in that state.80 On the other
hand, companies having their statutory seat and their
effective management in different EU Member States
are not disqualified.81
Under Arts. 15(1) and 2(1)(b) the issue of residency
is thus examined by reference to domestic and treaty
law. Accordingly where it is placed in the position of
the state of source, Switzerland should proceed
according to a `two steps approach'. That is, it should,
first of all, be determined whether the parent company
of the Swiss distributing subsidiary qualifies as a
resident under the domestic tax law of an EU Member
State; in other words, whether the parent company is
`liable to tax' in a Member State within the meaning of
Art. 4 of the OECD MC.82 If this is the case, it should
then be examined whether this conclusion is challenged
by any DTC concluded by that state with a non-EU
state.83 Indeed, in the affirmative, Art. 15 would not be
applicable. In essence, therefore, the main situations to
be taken into consideration may be summarized by the
following table.
Notes
75 See for example FTA Circular of 1 June 2004 on restructurings, in particular p. 60, example 22(4).
76 The same conflict may also occur in a DTC context and should, in our opinion, be resolved in the same fashion, see Danon and Salome, n. 50 above, p. 352.
77 Maisto, see n. 22 above, p. 178. This author does not however suggest an interpretation on the basis of the attribution rules of the state of residence but rather
simply that an autonomous analysis should prevail. Other commentators, by contrast, have considered this problem but have simply submitted that Art. 5 and Art.
4 of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive should apply if the state of source, respectively the state of residence considers that the distribution is deemed to be made to the
parent, see Oliver, n. 74 above, p. 217, Helminen, 2000a, n. 32 above, p. 238. These commentators have however not considered the case in which the states
involved have diverging attribution principles (conflict of attribution).
78 See above 3.A.2.
79 See Reich, n. 71 above, pp. 436±437, no. 29 and Art. 14.
80 Terra and Wattel, n. 32 above, p. 495.
81 Ibid., p. 339.
82 FTA Guidelines (Art. 15, s. 6).
83 See FTA Guidelines (Art. 15, s. 7).
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6. Minimum holding level
Article 15(1) provides that both companies adopt the
form of a limited company. For Switzerland, as
mentioned in the Agreement itself, only three forms
of companies are mentioned84 despite the fact that
other types of corporate entities can be concerned by
Swiss withholding tax (e.g. the Genossenschaften ±
socieÂ teÂ coopeÂ ratives).85 The Agreement, however, does
not provide for a list of qualifying companies in the
Member States. Considering the close relationship
with the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, it seems appro-
priate to refer to the list enclosed to the Directive.86
The Agreement requires a direct holding in the
company making the distribution. This first means
that the 25 per cent threshold has to be directly
outstanding between the paying and the receiving
company. This being said, according to the FTA
Guidelines, a parent company is deemed to own its
Swiss subsidiary directly if a partnership is interposed
between the two companies but that, under the laws of
the state of residence of the parent, this partnership is
treated as fiscally transparent. This approach, which
has been advocated by leading commentators,87 is in
accordance with the general recommendation of the
OECD Partnership Report.88 The parent can however
not claim the benefits of Art. 15 if it holds less than a
25 per cent-interest, even if, indirectly, both companies
belong to the same parent company indirectly holding
at least the 25 per cent threshold.89
The direct holding requirement may also be
problematic where, for example, a constructive divi-
dend is made to a group company (other than the
parent). Indeed, as we have seen, Switzerland could, by
relying on its domestic attribution principles (direct
beneficiary theory) argue that Art. 15 does not apply
on the ground that this distribution is not made to a
company having a direct 25 per cent holding in the
Swiss subsidiary. In our opinion and for the reasons
exposed above,90 however, the constructive dividend
should for the purpose of the Agreement be deemed to
be `paid to' the parent company if, under the laws of
the state of residence, such distribution is allocated to
the parent company for tax purposes (triangular
theory). Indeed, in these instances, such an autono-
mous interpretation of the term `paid to', avoids a
source-residence conflict of attribution.
Finally, Art. 3(2) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive
allows the Member States to replace the criterion of
percentage in the capital of the subsidiary by the criteria
of the voting rights. This option does not exist in Art. 15
of the Agreement. Consequently, the voting rights are
irrelevant as far as the application of the Agreement is
concerned. This focus on the economical rights
corresponds to the Swiss domestic rules applied in
several circumstances, where the percentage of interest
in a subsidiary is meaningful.91 The reference to the
`capital' of the company also means that the subscribed
capital and not the paid-in capital is relevant. Only the
former criterion is representative for the level of
investment in the subsidiary. Finally, the FTA Guide-
lines (Art. 15)92 provide that, in order to compute the 25
per cent threshold, all types of equity investments must
be taken into account: ordinary shares, participation
certificates and profit sharing certificates.93 The same
holds true as regards loan re-characterized as equity
Notes
84 Aktiengesellschaft (socieÂteÂ anonyme)/Gesellschaft mit beschraÈnkter Haftung (socieÂteÂ aÁ responsabiliteÂ limiteÂe)/Kommanditaktiengesellschaft (socieÂteÂ en commandite
par actions).
85 Art. 4(1), lit. b of the WHTL.
86 Oberson, see n. 1 above, p. 114. The FTA Guidelines (Art. 15, s. 9, lit. b), also admit that, as long as no other list is available, the list enclosed to the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive must be used.
87 Robert Waldburger, `Satz der residualen Verrechnungssteuer bei Dividendenzahlungen an auslaÈ ndische Personengesellschaften', in IFF Forum fuÈr Steuerrecht 2002,
no. 1, p. 34.
88 See above.
89 On this issue for the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, see CeÂ cile Brokelind, Une interpreÂtation de la directive socieÂteÂs meÁres et filiales du 23 juillet 1990, Lund 2000,
p. 142.
90 See above.
91 The economical and not the voting rights are relevant to compute the threshold for the application of the participation exemption in the case of dividends and
capital gains (Arts. 69 and 70 of the Direct federal tax law ± DFTL), for tax free transfers of investments (Art. 61(1), lit. d and Art. 61(3 )of DFTL), etc. See in
particular Guideline 9/1998 issued by the Federal tax administration on participation exemption for dividends and capital gains on the disposal of qualifying
participations, 2.3.3., p. 4.
92 FTA Guidelines (Art. 15, s. 4).
93 `Genussscheine; bons de jouissance' according to Art. 657 of the Swiss Code of Obligation; the FTA Guidelines (Art. 15, s. 4) require that the existence of these
certificates is justified by specific documents.
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under thin-capitalization rules.94 This approach, which
is in line with the Parent-Subsidiary Directive,95 thus
implies that the benefit of Art. 15 should be granted
even if the holding threshold is reached as a result of a
reclassification of a loan into constructive equity.
7. Two-year holding requirement
Article 15(1) requires a two-year ownership period in
the paying subsidiary. This requirement is also
implemented in the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, where
Art. 3(2) allows Member States to introduce a similar
rule. Under EC law, the question came up as to
whether, under this condition, the withholding tax
could be avoided after two years only, or whether the
relief could already be requested earlier provided the
shares would be held during at least a two-year period.
This question was brought up to the ECJ in the famous
Denkavit case.96 The Court ruled that:
`. . .Member States cannot make the grant of the tax
advantage provided for by Article 5(1) of the
[Parent-Subsidiary Directive] subject to the condi-
tion that, at the moment when profits are dis-
tributed, the parent company should have had a
holding in the subsidiary during the minimum
period laid down pursuant to Article 3(2) [of the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive], so long as this period
is subsequently observed.'97
This interpretation of the two-year holding period also
applies under Art. 15(1) of the Agreement.98 As stated
by the Advocate General,99 the purpose of this
minimum holding period is to avoid short-term
concentration of non-qualifying small holdings in
order to temporarily exceed the 25 per cent threshold.
Such an abusive situation can, however, also be
avoided by requiring that the participation be held
for a two-year period after the payment of the dividend
benefiting from the Agreement. In addition, the
application of the Denkavit rule is also confirmed by
the wording of the Agreement. The use of the present
`. . .the parent has a direct minimum holding . . . for at
least two years . . .' indicates that the qualifying
holding does not necessarily need to have been held
during two years at the time of the distribution. This
argument was already used by the Advocate General
and by the ECJ in the Denkavit case.100
Consequently, the Swiss tax authorities expressly
accept the Denkavit practice and the granting of the
advantage of the Agreement before the expiration of
the two-year period.101 However, if the dividend is due
before the end of this period of time,102 the Swiss
distributing company has to pay to the FTA the
amount of withholding tax due as if Art. 15 of the
Agreement was not applicable (i.e. the residual with-
holding tax due based on the relevant double tax treaty
or 35 per cent if no treaty applies). The withholding
tax so paid will be refunded to the foreign parent
company, as the case may be, upon request after the
expiration of the two-year period.
As no transitional rule provides for the contrary,103
the benefits of the Agreement can be claimed for,
irrespective as to whether the subsidiary has been held
during two years before the entry into force of Art. 15.
This derives logically from the interpretation of the
purpose of the two-year restriction period.
8. Anti-abuse provisions
A. General remarks
Article 15(1) begins with a reserve for `. . . the
application of domestic or agreement-based provisions
for the prevention of fraud or abuse . . .', the wording
of which corresponds to Art. 1(2) of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive. As already mentioned here
above,104 it therefore appears clearly that the inter-
pretation of this provision will have to be made in light
of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.105 On the one hand,
like the Parent-Subsidiary Directive, the Agreement
does not provide for a definition of fraud and abuse.
Moreover, the wording of the Directive and of the
Agreement explicitly refer to the domestic and bilateral
anti-abuse provisions applicable in Switzerland and in
Notes
94 FTA Guidelines (Art. 15, s. 4 in fine).
95 Helminen, 2000a, see n. 32 above, p. 331; Bell, see n. 34 above, p. 24; Terra and Wattel, see n. 32 above, p. 514.
96 Denkavit International BV v Bundesamt fuÈr Finanzen, C-283/94 (C-291/94 ; C-292/94), ECJ.
97 Ibid., s. 32.
98 Hull, see n. 24 above, p. 73.
99 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 2 May 1996 (Denkavit case; ECJ 1996 I 5063), s. 39; see also Hull, n. 24 above, 2005, p. 73.
100 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, s. 36; Denkavit International BV v Bundesamt fuÈr Finanzen, C-283/94, ECJ, s. 25; see also Guglielmo Maisto, `The EC
Court's Interpretation of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive under the Denkavit Case', Intertax 1997, no. 5, p. 183.
101 FTA Guidelines (Art. 15, s. 5); see also Guideline 10/2005 issued by the Federal tax administration on 15 July 2005.
102 According to the FTA Guidelines (Art. 15, s. 11), the relevant criterium is not the payment as such but the due date of payment of the dividend.
103 Hull, see n. 24 above, p. 73.
104 See earlier in article.
105 It is however worth recalling that the anti-abuse provision of Art. 1(2) of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive also concerns the corporate income tax exemption for
dividend received, which is not covered by the Agreement.
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the Member States and does not seem to create an
autonomous supranational anti-abuse provision.106 On
the other hand, this should not mean that the parties to
the Agreement have the discretion to adopt any
definition of abuse in their legislation. Indeed, doing
so would allow a Country to unilaterally ± and against
the purpose of the treaty ± exclude certain situations or
companies from the scope of the Agreement by
introducing a particularly wide definition of abuse.107
To conciliate these two aspects, we are of the opinion
that based on a supranational concept of abuse, the
scope of the reference to domestic and bilateral law has
to be defined on an autonomous basis. Within this
scope, Switzerland and the Member States have the
discretion to define and implement their own domestic
and treaty anti-abuse rules.
To delimit the extent of the delegation to Member
States, it is generally recognized108 that a strict
interpretation of the term should be applied and that it
should take the purpose of the Agreement into
account.109 In this context, a controversy exists with
respect to the Parent-Subsidiary Directive on the effect of
the anti-abuse provision.110 Certain authors, based in
particular on the Denkavit case,111 consider that the anti-
abuse provision has no existence of its own and that
governments can only deny the application of a
favourable tax regime provided for in the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive if this is based on a specific
provision within the Directive.112 Another approach is
to consider that the anti-abuse clause has its own
meaning and can be implemented by Member States. In
this case, however, it cannot be used to broaden specific
anti-abuse provisions already contained in the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive.113 Moreover, it may only be used to
avoid abusive situations like, for instance, cases in which
the EU parent appears not to be the beneficial owner of
the dividend, it being understood that the mere fact that
the shareholder is located outside the EU should not be
sufficient to trigger an abusive situation.114 In our view,
the second approach is more convincing, in particular as
far as Art. 15 of the Agreement is concerned. Indeed, the
contents of Art. 15 clearly reserve the application of anti-
abuse provisions. It is therefore necessary to define the
scope of the reference by determining the extent of the
anti-abuse provision.
B. Scope of abuse
It appears clearly that the term fraud has to be
understood as a situation in which a taxpayer adopts
an illegal behaviour with a view to deceiving the tax
authorities. Traditionally the Swiss meaning of this
term is narrow and concerns criminal situations that
are not discussed herein.115 Rather, our attention
focuses on the concept of abuse.
Taking into account the close relationship existing
between the Agreement and the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive, it is important first to consider the concept
of abuse under EU law. An extensive analysis of this
concept was done by the Advocate General in the
Halifax case.116 After reviewing the case law dealing
with this matter, he indicated that:
`. . . assessment of the abuse is based on whether the
right claimed is consonant with the purposes of the
rules that formally give rise to it. The person
claiming the right is barred from invoking it only to
the extent to which the Community law provision
formally conferring that right is relied upon for the
achievement of ``an improper advantage, manifestly
contrary to the objective of that provision.''117 And
further: ``. . . this notion of abuse operates as a
principle governing the interpretation of Commu-
nity law . . .''. What appears to be a decisive factor
in affirming the existence of an abuse is the
teleological scope of the Community rules in-
voked.'118
Based on the foregoing, a situation should be
considered to be abusive if two cumulative conditions
are met: a subjective one and an objective one.119 The
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first condition should be considered fulfilled if the
structure under assessment has no other economical
purpose than obtaining a tax benefit, if it appears to
be `wholly artificial'120 and cannot resist a `commer-
cial-purpose-test'.121 The second (objective) criterion
consists in comparing the purpose and results
achieved by the activity at issue with the purpose
and objectives of the rule invoked. It is only if
`granting the benefits would be at odds with the
object and purpose of the EC law rule invoked . . .'122
that abuse can be asserted. Abuse therefore means
that circumstances lead to the consideration that the
situation is artificial and only pursue the objective of
benefiting from Community law.123 The concept of
abuse is, thus, closely related to the purpose of the
rule that might be used abusively.
The objective of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive is
to eliminate any downside resulting from cooperation
between companies of different Member States as
compared with cooperation between companies of the
same Member State, and hence to facilitate cross-
border cooperation.124 The objective is to create
conditions within the Community that correspond to
those of a domestic market.125 The question as to
whether a structure should be considered as abusive
should therefore be analysed as if the parent and the
subsidiary were to be located both in the same
jurisdiction. A country should not make it more
difficult for companies in two different Member States
to apply the Parent-Subsidiary Directive than to avail
themselves of similar rights of a strictly domestic
nature in situations of possible abuse.126 As Art. 15
pursues the objective of extending the advantage of the
Parent-Subsidiary Directive to Switzerland,127 its pur-
pose is also to create ± under the conditions of the
Agreement ± a situation in which the companies in
different jurisdictions should find themselves in a
position similar to domestic relationships. In the
context of the Agreement also, the question of abuse
should therefore be analysed as if the two companies
were both located in the same domestic jurisdiction.
Furthermore, considering the definition of abuse, it
appears that the analysis as to whether a situation
should be considered as abusive or not should be
performed on a case-by-case basis and therefore cannot
be determined in advance under general terms.128
States often introduce anti-abuse provisions drafted
in general and abstract terms and providing for general
exclusion of certain structures. In this case, authors
consider that the provision has to foresee an `escape
clause' allowing a demonstration that the transaction
has a real business purpose and does not only pursue
treaty shopping objectives; this is necessary to meet the
principle of proportionality.129 The French anti-abuse
provision130 is in this respect an illustrative example. It
prevents the application of the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive if the parent is controlled directly or
indirectly by non-EU residents, except if it can be
demonstrated that the structure does not pursue treaty
shopping purposes.131
C. Swiss domestic anti-abuse provisions
It is important to note that, at the time of the
publication of this article, Switzerland has not
implemented a specific anti-abuse provision dealing
with the application of Art. 15 of the Agreement. To
prevent abusive treaty shopping on outbound dividend
distributions, the Swiss authorities should therefore
rely on existing domestic regulations. The question
consists of determining, of course, whether such
provisions can be found in the Swiss legislative
framework.
1. The 1962 anti-abuse Decree
In 1962 Switzerland introduced in its domestic
legislation a Decree132 according to which treaty
protection is denied if certain conditions are fulfilled.
These provisions, however, remain ineffective against
abusive situation in which Switzerland is the source
country, as it only applies to situations where
Switzerland is the beneficiary of the income for which
treaty benefits are claimed (inbound dividends). The
concept of the 1962 Decree was, however, implemen-
ted in certain DTCs concluded by Switzerland. The
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effects of these clauses are discussed later in this
article.133
Even for inbound dividends,134 it is unclear as to
whether the 1962 Decree could apply so as to restrict
the scope of Art. 15 of the Agreement. One argument
that is commonly claimed in order to restrict its
scope in connection with the Agreement is the fact
that the 1962 Decree was implemented with the
objective of limiting the application of bilateral
treaties and cannot, therefore, have effect on the
Agreement. The FTA does not share this point of
view and considers that the 1962 Decree also applies
to Art. 15 of the Agreement, as it shall be deemed to
represent a multilateral `tax treaty'. Considering the
objective of the 1962 Decree ± the avoidance of the
improper application of tax treaties ± we must admit
that the point of view of the Swiss tax authorities
seems reasonable. However, taking into account the
scope of the reference to domestic law in Art. 15,135
the application of the 1962 Decree should not be done
purely objectively. Even if the criteria listed in the
1962 Decree and the Federal application guidelines
are met, the applicant should be entitled to demon-
strate that the structure was not set up with the sole
purpose of benefiting from Art. 15. The introduction
of such an `escape clause' which does not correspond
to the current practice of the Swiss authorities is
necessary for complying with the proportionality
principle. In our opinion, it is also compatible with
the text of the 1962 Decree.136 The demonstration
that a structure is not abusive should in particular be
achieved if the funds `transiting' through Switzerland
benefit to another Member State.
2. Strict interpretation of `beneficial ownership'
Another question that deserves attention is whether,
the benefit of Art. 15(1) is subject to the traditional
`beneficial ownership' requirement embodied in Art.
10 of the OECD MC since 1977. Indeed, unlike this
provision, the text of Art. 15(1) does not refer to
`beneficial ownership'. The FTA, however, is of the
opinion that this requirement is a general condition to
claim treaty protection and, therefore, that it is
implicitly contained in Art. 15(1).137 This opinion,
which corresponds to a clear trend of Swiss courts,138 is
however debatable. As a matter of fact, the need
expressly to include this requirement in the text of the
OECD MC in 1977 (as opposed for example to simply
clarifying this in the OECD Commentary), may
contradict this opinion. Further, as argued by certain
authors, the expression `beneficial ownership' has a
scope of its own and does not, in particular, coincide
with the term `paid to' which focuses on the issue of
personal attribution of income.139 The OECD Com-
mentary, as a result of its 2003 update, on the other
hand, suggests the contrary by stating that the
`beneficial ownership' requirement is simply designed
to clarify the terms `paid . . .to a resident of the other
contracting State'.140
This being said, the foregoing debate may be left
opened in the context of Art. 15(1). Indeed, it should
be borne in mind that this provision reserves domestic
anti-abuse provisions. As mentioned above,141 the
purpose of Art. 15 of the Agreement is to achieve,
between Switzerland and the EU Member States, a
situation similar to domestic relationships. It seems
therefore necessary to consider Art. 21(1), lit. a of
WHTL ± that states that the Swiss withholding tax can
only be recovered by another Swiss resident if the latter
is the beneficial owner of this income142 ± and to allow
its application by analogy143 on cases in which the
application of Art. 15 is requested. In order to avoid
any misunderstanding, it is worth clarifying that Art.
21 of WHTL does not override Art. 15 of the
Agreement. The latter refers to domestic law and, by
doing so, allows the use of Art. 21 of WHTL. Finally,
although the Parent-Subsidiary Directive does not refer
to `beneficial ownership', it is generally accepted that
this condition may, in the context of the reservation of
domestic anti-abuse provisions, also be used to tackle
`directive-shopping'.144 A teleological interpretation of
Art. 15(1) on the basis of the Parent-Subsidiary
Directive, therefore confirms that this rule is indeed
subject to a beneficial ownership requirement.
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The idea underlying the use of the concept of
`beneficial ownership' is to adopt an economical
approach focusing on the control exercized by the
recipient of the income145 in order to avoid abuse.146
Doing so prevents formally interposing a parent
company in a Member State just for benefiting from
the Agreement. The company claiming the application
of Art. 15 needs, on the contrary, to be the economical
owner of the income received, i.e. to be free to decide
whether or not the capital should be used or made
available for use by others or how the yields should be
used, or both.147 This definition based on the control
over the income for which withholding tax could be
levied corresponds to the definition of the persons
entitled to claim a refund under Art. 21(1), lit. a of
WHTL.148 Due to the fact that the concept of
beneficial ownership is used primarily to avoid treaty
shopping, it is of course necessary to apply it in a
restrictive manner and based on the facts and
circumstances of each particular situation.149 The
beneficial ownership might in particular be denied
where a specific arrangement exists between the
apparent owner and the entity owning the economical
rights over the income.150 On the other hand, the mere
fact that the beneficiary of a dividend is a company
which is itself held by an ultimate parent company
incorporated outside the EU or outside Switzerland,
and to which it distributes its profits, cannot, as such,
be considered to be a criterion sufficient for denying
the beneficial ownership.151 It is only if the structure
appears to be abusive that the protection of the
Agreement should be denied. It therefore appears clear
that the question of the beneficial ownership is closely
related to the concept of abuse. Indeed, in most cases
where the issue of the effective beneficiary was raised,
the Swiss courts also analysed the situation from the
standpoint of the treaty shopping issue.152
3. Application of domestic anti-abuse provision
The concept of abuse is well known in Swiss tax law.
According to the Federal Supreme Court,153 a situation
represents a tax avoidance154 if:
(i) the structure is organized in an odd, inadequate or
unusual way,
(ii) in order to save taxes, and
(iii) the construction effectively allows to achieve a
significant tax saving.
If these three conditions are cumulatively met, it means
that the structure creates a tax advantage for the
taxpayer due to a loophole in the law;155 by adopting a
substance-over-form practice, tax avoidance will be
avoided. This domestic definition of tax avoidance is
very close to the one given by the Advocate General in
the Halifax case.156 The two first criteria correspond to
what is defined in this case as the subjective element,
i.e. an artificial set up created with a view to saving
taxes. Regarding the objective component under EU
understanding, i.e. the teleological analysis of the
result of the application of the rule, it also applies
under the Swiss concept of tax avoidance. Here also,
the purpose of the provision that is abusively claimed
has to be taken into account in order to determine
whether the structure effectively allows to save taxes
(condition (iii)). Therefore, the Swiss concept of tax
avoidance fits within the scope of the reference under
Art. 15 of the Agreement.
The FTA157 considers that the abuse mentioned
under Art. 15 of the Agreement corresponds to Art. 2,
para. 2 of the Swiss Civil Code, i.e. the provision
introducing the principle of abuse of law in the Swiss
legal system. This is appropriate as the concept of tax
avoidance ultimately relies on this principle.158 How-
ever, it is too far away from the tax reality to be
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applicable directly on Art. 15. In addition the Swiss tax
law contains a legal provision which, in our opinion, is
much more adequate to prevent abusive situations in
the context of Art. 15. Indeed Art. 21, para. 2 of
WHTL explicitly provides that `Refund [of Swiss
withholding tax] is unacceptable in all cases where it
would lead to tax avoidance'. Of course, this provision
concerns domestic refund of withholding tax and is not
directly applicable to international situations when
benefits of DTCs are claimed.159 In the case of Art. 15
of the Agreement, however, the treaty explicitly refers
to `domestic provisions for the prevention of . . .
abuse'. As we have seen here above, the concept of
tax avoidance under Swiss law corresponds to what
the reference in Art. 15 seeks to avoid. It therefore
seems appropriate to apply Art. 21, para. 2 of WTHTL
by analogy, in particular considering the objective of
the Agreement which is to create on an international
basis a situation that correspond to the domestic
reality.
Two elements, however, need to be kept in mind.
First, tax avoidance must remain exceptional, hence
restricted to extreme cases,160 and should only be
decided on a case-by-case basis (when it appears that
the structure obviously does not have any business
purpose161). Second, the structure must lead to an
effective tax saving. This means for instance that tax
avoidance should not disqualify the application of
Art. 15 in favour of a parent company in a Member
State A with the sole argument that it allows another
company in a Member State B to benefit from the
income.
D. Treaty based anti-abuse provisions
If Art. 15(1) of the Agreement introduces a reserve
for `agreement based' anti-abuse provisions, Art.
15(3) also states that `existing double taxation
agreements between Switzerland and the Member
States which provide for a more favorable taxation
treatment of dividends, interests and royalties pay-
ments at the time of adoption of this Agreement shall
remain unaffected'. The FTA draws two correct
statements out of this provision.162 First the compa-
nies falling within the scope of the Agreement can
choose between the application of Art. 15 or ± if
more favourable ± of a specific DTC. Secondly, a
specific provision in a DTC can only limit the
application of Art. 15 if it was introduced after the
entry into force of the latter provision163 (lex poster-
ior derogat priori).
Specific conditions outstanding in DTCs at the time
of entry into force of the Agreement and introducing
additional requirements to benefit from a full with-
holding tax relief than the one provided by Art. 15
therefore do not apply anymore. For instance, if a
Swiss subsidiary is held by a French parent company
owned itself by a US company, Art. 15 of the
Agreement allows to avoid entirely the Swiss with-
holding tax, although the Swiss-French DTC164 may,
in this case, lead to a non-refundable Swiss with-
holding tax of 15 per cent.
This situation makes sense. The objective of the
Agreement being to extend the effects of the Parent-
Subsidiary Directive to Switzerland for withholding
taxes, the application of specific double tax treaty
provisions entered into with certain Member States
would lead to different results depending on the place
of incorporation of the parent company in the EU.
This would obviously be contrary to the objective of
Art. 15. Like in the EU, the Agreement shall prevail
over DTCs.165 Furthermore, `limitation of benefit'
clauses can, indeed, not be seen as anti-abuse rules as
defined here above,166 as they introduce objective
restrictions and do not provide for an `escape clause'.
The question then arises as to whether specific anti-
abuse rules contained in DTCs concluded by Switzer-
land prior to the entry into force of the Agreement are
still applicable and can limit the application of Art. 15.
Due to the wording of Art. 15, there is little doubt that
real anti-abuse provisions included in tax treaties could
apply. The issue is whether treaties entered into by
Switzerland contain such provisions that would
introduce additional limitations than the ones existing
under domestic law.
The DTC entered into with the Netherlands includes
for instance an anti-abuse provision167 allowing the
Contracting States to deny treaty protection if a
company was established in a Contracting State
primarily to benefit from the treaty. The range of such
an anti-abuse provision does not go beyond what Art.
Notes
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21, para. 2 of WHTL already allows, and it does not
introduce a more restrictive element. Treaties entered
into with France,168 Belgium169 and Italy170 include a
provision corresponding to the restrictions introduced
by the 1962 Decree into the respective tax treaties. This
means that treaty protection is denied for relief of
withholding tax on dividends, interests and royalties
under certain objective conditions.171 Although the
Swiss tax authorities believe that these specific provi-
sions still apply,172 we are of the opinion that they no
longer have effect since the entry intro force of Art. 15
of the Agreement. Either these provisions are autono-
mous, have an objective effect and are therefore still
applicable if their criteria are fulfilled. They then exceed
the scope of the anti-abuse provision in Art. 15 as
defined here above and cannot override Art. 15.173 Or
one considers that they represent a real anti-abuse
provision, but then the taxpayer must have the
possibility to demonstrate that the structure is not
abusive. In this case the effect of these special treaty
provisions cannot go much beyond the limitations set by
the tax avoidance rule (Art. 21, para. 2 of WHTL). At
most they can represent an inversion of the burden of
the proof as the companies would then have to
demonstrate the absence of treaty shopping.
9. Subject to tax requirements
Like Art. 2(1), lit. c of the Parent-Subsidiary Directive,
Art. 15(1) contains a subject-to-tax clause requiring
that both (the paying and the receiving) companies are
subject to corporation tax without being exempted.
This requirement is therefore also relevant from the
perspective of the Swiss distributing company.
Considering the complex Swiss tax system based
on several layers of tax authorities174 and containing
various tax regimes, this provision initially triggered
an important uncertainty.175 With the publication of
the FTA Guidelines (Art. 15)176 the situation is now
much clearer. The subject-to-tax clause relates to
corporation tax levied on the income177 and does not
concern taxes computed independently from the
amount of profit realized by the entity, like net
wealth tax, business taxes, VAT, etc.178 In this
respect, the Swiss tax authorities have taken the
position that the exemption mentioned under Art. 15
refers to the subjective tax liability. This means that a
company will fall outside of the scope of the
Agreement if it is not liable to pay any tax.179 On
the other hand, if the entity is considered as a
taxpayer, it will qualify for the application of Art. 15
of the Agreement, even if its tax base is computed in a
particular way and excludes certain element (objec-
tive exemption). This interpretation corresponds to
the wording of the Agreement and to what is
generally admitted in the EU for the application of
the Parent-Subsidiary Directive.180 Consequently
Swiss companies liable to pay taxes in Switzerland
but benefiting from a special tax regime (holding
companies, auxiliary companies, domicile companies)
can still claim for the advantage of the Agreement on
dividends paid and received,181 provided of course
that the other conditions of Art. 15(1) are met. This
interpretation is also reinforced by the wording of
Art. 15(2). As far as interest and royalty payments are
concerned, the Agreement states that the application
of Art. 15 requires the objective tax liability of these
items of income,182 which a contrario is not the case
for dividends.
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capitaux mobiliers ± ReÂgime de la distribution ± ReÂgime fiscal des dividendes distribueÂs aux socieÂteÂs meÁres d'Etats membres de la C.E.E., 4 J-2-92) s. 25.
181 See also Hull, n. 24 above, p. 72; Oberson, see n. 1 above, p. 113.
182 Art. 15(2), indent 4: `all companies are subject to corporation tax without being exempted in particular on interest and royalty payments . . .' (emphasis added).
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